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ABSTRACT
In RFID protocols, tags identify and authenticate them-
selves to readers. At Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudenay studied se-
curity and privacy models for these protocols. We extend
this model to protocols which offer reader authentication
to tags. Whenever corruption is allowed, we prove that se-
cure protocols cannot protect privacy unless we assume tags
have a temporary memory which vanishes by itself. Un-
der this assumption, we study several protocols. We enrich
a few basic protocols to get secure mutual authentication
RFID protocols which achieve weak privacy based on pseu-
dorandom functions only, narrow-destructive privacy based
on random oracles, and narrow-strong and forward privacy
based on public-key cryptography.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
D.2.8 [Software Engineering]: Metrics—complexity mea-
sures, performance measures
Keywords
identification protocol, privacy, RFID
1. RFID SECURITY AND PRIVACY
RFID refers to wireless protocols which make it possible
to identify mobile tags to readers in a given system. Typ-
ically, the reader together with the system is considered as
a single powerful and secure participant, but tags are tiny
inexpensive devices which are not secure, prone to corrup-
tion, and with little computational capabilities. RFID tags
become pervasive, thus lead us to privacy threats. For this,
the study for security and privacy of RFID protocols (while
preserving efficiency) has become a hot research topic.
RFID schemes are characterized by a three-fold quality.
Correctness ensures that legitimate tags interacting with the
reader are correctly identified or authenticated. Security
says that an adversary cannot impersonate a legitimate tag
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to the reader. Privacy makes sure that an adversary cannot
link relationships (such as being the same) between a tag
which was observed at some point at a given moment and
another one. Clearly, the purpose of RFID is to identify to
the reader but to nobody else.
We typically assume adversaries who can tamper with any
wireless communication, pick random tags, force protocols
to run with tags or the reader. Ohkubo, Suzuki, and Ki-
noshita [10, 11, 9] first introduced RFID which could still
provide privacy even though an adversary would eventually
corrupt tags to open their memory. This fits the notion of
forward privacy. Their protocol was formally proven in an
ad-hoc privacy model well fitted to their protocol. A formal
definition for privacy was considered by Avoine [1, 2] with
the notion of corruption except on target tags. It was ex-
tended by Juels and Weis [6] who introduced side channels:
an adversary could learn whether or not a reader succeeded
to identify a tag. Those models were suffering from elim-
inating many attacks such as those tampering with target
tags, mainly to eliminate trivial attacks. Those categories
of models have been generalized and classified by Vaude-
nay [14]. To eliminate trivial attacks, these models compare
interaction of the adversary with the tags to interaction of
the adversary with blinded communication to the tags.
An alternate approach relates to the universal composabil-
ity model. For this, Burmester, van Le, and de Medeiros [3,
13] defined several versions of an ideal functionality.
Following [14], adversaries are called weak if corruption is
not permitted, forward if corruption is performed at the end
of the attack only, destructive if corruption destroys the tag,
or strong otherwise. Orthogonally, adversaries are called
narrow if they cannot learn whether the reader completed
the protocol by identifying any tag or not. It was proven that
narrow-strong privacy requires at least techniques which are
enough to build a secure key agreement protocol and could
be achieved with a secure public-key cryptosystem. Con-
versely, narrow-destructive privacy is possible using random
oracles, and weak privacy is possible using pseudorandom
functions only.
One of the concerns users may have is that a malicious
reader can obtain unauthorized information from a tag, rais-
ing security or privacy issues. In order to fix this problem,
beside tag’s authentication, a protocol must ensure reader’s
authentication: it means that a tag must be confident of
the reader’s identity before sending any information or its
ID. In this case we obtain a mutual authentication proto-
col. Several such protocols have been proposed: Burmester,
van Le and de Medeiros proposed the O-FRAP protocol [13].
Tsudik [12] proposed the YA-TRIP and YA-TRAP schemes,
both based on timestamps. Lim and Kwon proposed an-
other protocol in [7]. These schemes do no use of public-
key cryptography, but they are either not weak private or
not narrow-forward private under our model. Although this
was already mentioned by their authors, we simply stress
that they are constant in not achieving both properties at
the same time. So the question of achieving both without
public-key cryptography is open.
Structure of the paper.
We first recall definitions from [14] in Section 2 and extend
them to address mutual authentication. Section 3 provides
useful results to prove security and privacy. Then, we show
the impossibility of narrow-forward privacy in Section 4.
This leads us to modifying the tag model so that some tem-
porary memory is automatically erased whenever the tag no
longer received any power. Section 5 relates to already pro-
posed protocols. Finally, Section 6 enriches the three pro-
tocols from [14] and proves their security and privacy. We
obtain 3-pass protocols which are secure RFID schemes with
mutual authentication. Weak privacy is achieved based on
pseudorandom functions only. Narrow-destructive privacy
is achieved based on random oracles. Narrow-strong and
forward privacy is achieved based on an IND-CCA secure
public-key cryptosystem.
2. DEFINITIONS
Following [14], an RFID scheme is defined by
• an algorithm SetupReader(1s) to generate common in-
put (typically: domain parameters, a public key KP ),
a secret key KS , and initialize a database
• an algorithm SetupTag(ID) using the common input
to generate a tag-specific secret K and its initial state
S. When the tag is meant to be a legitimate one, the
entry (ID,K) is inserted in the database
• a 2-party protocol between the reader and a tag in
which the reader protocol uses the common input, the
database, and the secret, produces an output equal to
⊥ if identification failed or some ID if it succeeded, and
may update the database.
The protocol is correct if executing it honestly leads to the
reader to infer the correct ID of a tag when it is legitimate,
or ⊥ when it is not, except with negligible probability.
To address mutual authentication, we enrich this defini-
tion by introducing an output on the tag side which should
be OK or ⊥. The protocol is correct if executing it honestly
with a legitimate tag, it outputs OK, except with negligible
probability.
We further define simple protocols in which the reader
protocol follows a special form in which the communication
protocol algorithm, the tag identification algorithm, and the
database update algorithm satisfy the following properties.
• The reader protocol computes the protocol messages
without any access to the database.
• There is a predicate RKS based on the secret key KS
on (ID,K, τ) triplets used to define a set of all tag
IDs having a database entry (ID,K) which are called
compatible with a protocol final transcript τ .
• The reader protocol runs an algorithm SKS on a set
of compatible IDs as input to produce the output ID.
This algorithm always picks an element in the input
set (or fails if empty).
• After ID is output, an extra algorithm with input KS ,
τ , and the selected (ID,K) database entry may update
this entry in the database before the reader protocol
terminates.
RKS and SKS may be invoked as oracles in the “simple
security” definition. For simplicity we omit KS from nota-
tions.
Adversaries.
Adversaries use the common input and may use the fol-
lowing oracles.
• CreateTagb(ID) to create a tag with a given ID which
is legitimate (if b = 1) or not (if b = 0). If legitimate,
this oracle updates the database of the reader. The
oracle returns nothing.
• DrawTag(distr) to run a sampling algorithm distr to
generate a tuple (ID1, . . . , IDn) of pairwise different val-
ues. If tag IDi is legitimate, bi is set to 1. Otherwise it
is set to 0. If tag IDi is currently free, it is moved to a
set of drawn tags and assigned with a new temporary
identity vtagi, pi is set to (vtagi, bi), and a new entry
vtagi 7→ IDi is inserted to the table T . Otherwise, pi
is set to ⊥. The oracle returns (p1, . . . , pn). All ID’s
and table T remain unknown to the adversary.
• Free(vtag) to move the drawn tag with temporary
identity vtag back to the set of free tags. The tag can
no longer be accessed with its temporary identity vtag.
The oracle returns nothing.
• Launch to start a new protocol session on the reader
side. This oracle returns a new session identification
number pi. We assume that sessions are associated
to an internal state and that sessions can run concur-
rently on the reader. In contrast, tags have a single
state so only one session can be run.
• SendReader and SendTag to send a message to a
given protocol session on the reader (identified by some
pi value) or on a drawn tag (identified by its vtag value).
These oracles return a message to be sent back to the
counterpart.
• Result(pi) to get 0 if the output on session pi is ⊥ and
1 otherwise.
• Corrupt(vtag) to get the internal state of tag with
temporary identity vtag. When vtag is no longer used,
we say that the tag is destroyed.
The capabilities of adversaries will be kept unchanged to
study mutual authentication.
We say that vtag and pi had a matching conversation if
there is a protocol session on vtag in which the adversary
faithfully forwarded messages from one to the other (among
other interaction with other tags or other reader sessions) in
the right interleaved sequence.
Security.
A scheme provides security if it provides secure tag au-
thentication and secure reader authentication. The notion of
secure tag authentication is unchanged from [14]. Basically,
tag authentication is insecure if there exists a polynomial-
time adversary such that one reader protocol session identi-
fied some tag ID before it was corrupted but had no match-
ing conversation with tag ID on any drawn form, with non-
negligible probability of success. Similarly, reader authenti-
cation is insecure if there exists a polynomial-time adversary
such that one tag session on a legitimate tag output OK but
had no matching conversation with any reader session, with
non-negligible probability.
In [14], a weaker notion of security called simple security
restricts to adversaries making no use of the Result oracle,
creating a single tag and ending on a final SendReader
on a reader session pi but using the two additional oracles
R and S of the simple protocol definition. The adversary
succeeds if the session pi identified the tag but that it did
not have any matching conversation. It was shown that a
scheme based on a simple protocol form achieving simple
security also achieves secure tag authentication.
Since [14] only considered tag authentication, this defini-
tion relates to simple tag authentication. We enrich it with
the notion of simple reader authentication by saying that an
adversary wins if there is a tag session which ended by ac-
cepting the reader but had no matching conversation with
any reader session. We have simple security if we have both
simple tag authentication and simple reader authentication.
Privacy.
The definition of privacy is unchanged from [14]. Basi-
cally, a scheme offers privacy against adversaries in class P
if for any adversary A in P which ends by getting the final
table T from the DrawTag oracle and output a Boolean,
there exists a blinder B such that executing A or AB leads
to undistinguishable output.
A blinder is an algorithm who sees the common input and
all interaction between the adversary and the oracles and
who simulates the answers from SendReader, SendTag,
and Result. Namely, a blinder simulates the protocol mes-
sages. An adversary breaks privacy if its result could not
have been obtained without the protocol messages.
All polynomial-time adversaries are in the class STRONG.
Adversaries who always destroy tags after corruption are in
the subclass DESTRUCTIVE. Adversaries who never query
any oracle except Corrupt after corruption are in the sub-
class FORWARD. Adversaries who do no corruption are in
the subclass WEAK. In addition to this, adversaries who do
not query Result are in the subclass NARROW.
3. TOOLS FOR PROVABLE SECURITY
To prove security, we use the same technique as in [14].
Essentially, for a scheme accommodating a simple protocol
following our definition, if we can prove simple security, i.e.
security when the adversary is using a single tag, then we
obtain full security. The proof is basically the same as for
[14, Lemma 5].
Lemma 1. Let us consider an RFID scheme based on a
simple protocol which is simply secure. We assume there ex-
ists a computable predicate R′ such that for any matching
conversation of transcript τ between a tag ID and the reader
having (ID,K) in database, we have R(ID,K, τ) ⇐⇒ R′(n)
where n is the number of consecutive completed protocol exe-
cutions on the tag ID before since the last one with a match-
ing conversation that led to the reader identifying ID. The
scheme is secure.
Typically, R′(n) is always true with the exception of OSK-
like protocols (see Section 6.2). In this case, R′(n) is true
only when n is less than a given threshold t.
Another useful tool concerns RFID protocols which have
been “enriched” with an extra round from the reader to the
tag which does not modify the tag state.
Lemma 2. Let S and S′ be two RFID protocols in which
S′ is enriched from S by simply adding an extra message
from the reader to the tag for mutual authentication. We
assume that the final message does not modify the tag state.
If S is correct, then S′ is correct as for the reader output.
We further recall the following lemma form [14].
Lemma 3. We consider an RFID scheme with the prop-
erty that whenever a legitimate tag and the reader have some
matching conversation, the reader does not output ⊥. If the
scheme offers tag authentication, then narrow-forward (resp.
narrow-weak) privacy implies forward (resp. weak) privacy.
4. IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT
We first show that our basic model for tags does not leave
any room for privacy whenever corruption is allowed.
Theorem 1. In the basic model where corruption reveals
the entire tag state, no RFID scheme providing secure reader
authentication is narrow-forward private.
Proof. We consider the following narrow-forward adver-
sary.
1: create two legitimate tags ID0 and ID1
2: draw one at random and get vtag
3: execute a protocol between vtag and the reader but stops
before the last SendTag(vtag,m) query (if the protocol
makes it unclear which message is the last one, just guess
it) and stores m
4: free vtag
5: draw tags ID0 and ID1
6: corrupt them and get their states S0 and S1
7: set a bit b such that simulating a tag of state Sb with
the incoming message m leads to output OK (if no or
both Sb work, set b to a random bit)
8: get T and output whether T (vtag) = IDb
Assuming that the SendTag query is really the last one, due
to reader authentication we know that the tag outputs OK
with negligible probability when fed with message different
from m or with a non-final message m and ⊥ with negli-
gible probability when fed with the final message m. So,
if p is the probability for guessing the last query right, the
adversary wins with probability close to p+ 1
2
(1−p) = 1+p
2
.
For any blinded adversary, tags run no protocol so there
is a negligible probability for getting an m leading to OK,
the probability for winning is close to 1
2
. Hence, the advan-
tage is p/2 which is non-negligible for any blinder. So, the
adversary is significant.
To fix this impossibility problem, we must change the tag
model. Indeed, from now on we assume that some tempo-
rary memory is automatically erased from the tag as soon
as the tag is put back in the set of free tags. This is quite
a reasonable assumption since temporary memory requires
power to be maintained. It further thwart the previous at-
tack since step 4 will flush out the information about the
internal state which is needed in step 7.
5. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we study several protocols based on sym-
metric cryptography only. We notice that they all fail to
provide either weak privacy or narrow-forward privacy. Our
results do not contradict the security and privacy results
from their authors. As a matter of fact, this was already
made clear from their papers. Our point is that all proto-
cols so far are constant in not achieving both properties. It
thus seems to be hard to address weak privacy and narrow-
forward privacy at the same time by using only symmetric
cryptography. So far, we do not know whether this is feasible
or not.
5.1 Weak Privacy Failures
In [12], Tsudik proposed YA-TRAP and YA-TRAP*, two
authentication protocols. These protocols are both based
on timestamps, which makes the system vulnerable to de-
nial of service attacks. In YA-TRAP, the reader sends a
random challenge Rr, together with a reader timestamp Tr.
The tag checks Tr, and if it is valid (reader’s timestamp
should be higher than tag’s timestamp, but should be lower
than the maximum value Tmax), it updates its timestamp Tt,
and computes the response to the reader’s challenge, using
a MAC and its specific secret Ki. For the authentication,
it picks a random challenge Rt, and computes a MAC us-
ing the two random challenges (Rr, Rt) and Ki. The reader
verifies the two MACs in the database.
For YA-TRAP*, Tsudik introduced a denial of service re-
sistance, which in fact only limits the period in which the
tag is out of service. As the significant adversaries for weak
privacy for the two protocols are similar, we present the one
for YA-TRAP for more readability.
We can perform the same kind of attack as the one of
Juels-Weis against the Modified Ohkubo-Suzuki-Kinoshita
protocol [6]. The difference appears in the manners in which
the tag is desynchronized with the reader: in the initial case
(Juels-Weis attack) it is desynchronized by several fake au-
thentication request, while in this case it can be easily desyn-
chronized by sending as the timestamp, the maximum pos-
sible value. In this case, the tag will update its timestamp
value to the maximum possible value, so future authentica-
tion requests will clearly fail. The formal attack is:
1: create two legitimate tags ID0 and ID1
2: (vtag0,.) ← GetTag(ID0)
3: SendTag(vtag0, Tmax, Rr)
4: Free(vtag0)
5: draw one tag at random and get vtag
6: pi ← Launch
7: Execute(vtag)
8: x← Result(pi)
9: output whether T (vtag) = IDx
This is clearly a significant adversary for weak privacy.
Thus, YA-TRAP is not weak private, and furthermore nei-
ther is YA-TRAP*. It can be observed that the tag specific
secret Ki is not updated, so narrow-forward privacy is not
achieved either.
Due to the Juels-Weis attack [6] on OSK [10, 11], the
protocol based on OSK from Section 6 does not achieve weak
privacy. (See [14].)
5.2 Narrow-Forward Privacy Failures
Our OSK-based protocol from Section 6 achieves narrow-
forward privacy but not weak privacy because the tag state
is updated before the tag authenticated the reader. If we
now consider the same protocol in which the tag state is up-
dated after the reader authentication, we show that narrow-
forward privacy is no longer achieved. Let us consider the
following adversary.
1: create two legitimate tags ID0 and ID1
2: (vtag0,.) ← GetTag(ID0)
3: pi ← Launch
4: a← SendReader(pi)
5: c← SendTag(vtag0, a)
6: Free(vtag0)
7: d← SendReader(pi, c)
8: draw one tag at random and get vtag
9: S ← Corrupt (vtag)
10: if d = F ′(S, a) then
11: x← 0
12: else
13: x← 1
14: end if
15: output whether T (vtag) = IDx
We have Pr[A wins] ≈ 1. For any blinder B, Pr[AB wins] =
1
2
. Therefore the adversary is a significant narrow-forward
adversary (no active action after corruption and no Result
query), so this protocol would not be narrow-forward pri-
vate.
We now present the attack against the O-FRAP proto-
col [3]. This protocol is initiated by the reader which sends
a random value rsys. The tag uses a pseudo-random func-
tion F to compute four values ν1, ν2, ν3, ν4 from the tag’s key
katag, rsys and a tag’s random value rtag. The first value, ν1
is used to update rtag, the second one, ν2 is sent by the tag
to the reader in order to authenticate itself; ν3 is sent by the
reader, to authenticate itself for the tag and ν4 is used to
update the tag’s internal key katag. The reader keeps a copy
of the previous value of the tag key in order to be able to
authenticate the tag, even if for any reason, the tag did not
update its key. The problem appears when the last message
of the protocol (that authenticate the reader) is blocked. We
present a significant narrow-forward adversary against this
protocol:
1: create two legitimate tags ID0 and ID1
2: draw one at random and get vtag
3: (rtag, ν2) ← SendTag(rsys)
4: Free(vtag)
5: (vtag0,.) ← GetTag(ID0)
6: K ← Corrupt (vtag0)
7: if (., ν2, ., .) = F (K, rsys, rtag) then
8: x← 0
9: else
10: x← 1
11: end if
12: output whether T (vtag) = IDx
We have Pr[A wins] ≈ 1. For any blinder B, Pr[AB wins] =
1
2
. Therefore the adversary is a significant narrow-forward
Tag System
state: S (S = K) {. . . , (ID,K), . . .}
pick b ∈ {0, 1}β a←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− pick a ∈ {0, 1}α
c = FS(0, a, b)
b,c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ find (ID,K) s.t. c = FK(0, a, b)
if not found, set K to random
check d = FS(1, a, b)
d←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− d = FK(1, a, b)
output: OK iff check output: ID or ⊥ if not found
Figure 1: A Weak-Private RFID Scheme based on PRF.
adversary (no active action after corruption and no Result
query), so the scheme is not narrow-forward private.
In [7], Lim and Kwon proposed an authentication pro-
tocol that we will call LK. It is based on the OSK key
chain protocol. In order to avoid key desynchronization,
they introduce a second key chain, which is updated by
the reader and verified by the tag. The problem appears
when an adversary queries a tag more than m times: the
tag state becomes static until the first correct authentica-
tion with the reader. During this time, there exists a sig-
nificant narrow-forward adversary A, which we present be-
low:
1: create two legitimate tags ID0 and ID1
2: (vtag0,.) ← GetTag(ID0)
3: for i = 1 to m+ 1 do
4: pick a random r1
5: SendTag(vtag0, r1)
6: wait for the tag’s response
7: pick a random σ1
8: SendTag(vtag0, σ1)
9: end for
10: pi ← Launch
11: r1 ← SendReader(pi)
12: (ti, r2, σ1)← SendTag(vtag0, a)
13: Free(vtag0)
14: draw one tag at random and get vtag
15: si ← Corrupt(vtag)
16: if σ1 = ext(f(si, r1 ‖ r2), l1) then
17: x← 0
18: else
19: x← 1
20: end if
21: output whether T (vtag) = IDx
We have Pr[A wins] ≈ 1. For any blinder B, we have
Pr[AB wins] = 1
2
. Therefore the adversary is a significant
narrow-forward adversary (no active action after corruption
and noResult query), so LK protocol is not narrow-forward
private.
6. ENRICHED PROTOCOLS
6.1 Weak Privacy based on PRF
A pseudorandom function family (PRF) is a family of
functions (Fs,K)K∈{0,1}k(s) from {0, 1}δ(s) to {0, 1}γ(s) such
that k, δ, γ are polynomially bounded, 2−δ(s), and 2−γ(s) are
negligible, Fs,K(x) is computable in polynomial time, and
any distinguisher with polynomial complexity has a negligi-
ble advantage for distinguishing an oracle simulating Fs,K
initialized with a random K from an oracle initialized with
a truly random function. (For more readability we omit the
parameter s.)
We enrich the protocol from [14] based on a pseudorandom
function to achieve security and weak privacy with an extra
round. We follow Fig. 1 with α = β = δ−1
2
. The tag setup
SetupTag(ID) picks a random k-bit key K and sets S = K.
1. The reader picks a random α-bit string a and sends it
to the tag.
2. The tag with state S sends a random β-bit string b
and c = FS(0, a, b) to the reader.
3. The reader looks for (ID,K) in the database such that
c = FK(0, a, b), gets ID, and sends back d = FK(1, a, b).
(If no entry is found, d is computed with a random K.)
4. The reader checks d to authenticate the reader.
The protocol is equivalent to the ISO/IEC 9798-2 3-pass
mutual authentication protocol that is used in [5] and to
the CR building block of [8]. It originally comes from the
variant from Weis et al. [15].
Theorem 2. If F is a PRF, the above RFID scheme is
secure and weak private.
The original scheme from [14] is not narrow-forward. The
enriched one is not either. This is the same as in Section 5.2.
Proof. We apply Lemma 2 to get reader correctness.
Correctness of the tag output works as in [14].
In the simple security model where there is a single tag,
no corruption, and no Result queries, we replace the F
computations by using the lazy sampling technique as fol-
lows. First, we assume that the reader never picks the same
a twice and that the tag never picks the same b twice so all
computations hold on different inputs. Then, we simulate
all c and d releases by random strings and show this does
not affect the success probability of the adversary, thanks
to the PRF property. We can then easily show that the
success probability is 2−γ times the total number of session
instances on both sides. Since this is negligible, we deduce
simple security thus security from Lemma 1.
To prove weak privacy, we only prove narrow-weak privacy
and apply Lemma 3. The above lazy sampling technique is
also well fitted to narrow-weak model, so a trivial blinder
which just picks random a, b, c, and d will work.
6.2 Narrow-Destructive Privacy in the Ran-
dom Oracle Model
We now enrich the protocol form [14] based on random
oracles. We use two oracles F and G implementing two
random functions from {0, 1}α+k+1 and {0, 1}k to {0, 1}k,
Tag System
state: S (S = K) {. . . , (ID,K), . . .}
a←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− pick a ∈ {0, 1}α
c = F (0, S, a)
d′ = F (1, S, a)
replace S by G(S)
c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ find (ID,K) and i s.t.
c = F (0, Gi(K), a) and i < t
replace K by Gi(K)
if not found, set K to random
check d = d′ d←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− d = F (1,K, a)
output: OK iff check output: ID or ⊥ if not found
Figure 2: A Narrow-Destructive-Private RFID Scheme based on a Random Oracle.
respectively. The tag generation SetupTag(ID) picks a ran-
dom k-bit key K and sets the initial state to S = K. The
protocol is depicted on Fig. 2.
1. The reader picks a random α-bit string a and sends it
to the tag.
2. The tag with state S sends the value c = F (0, S, a),
stores d′ = F (1, S, a) in temporary memory, then re-
freshes its state S with G(S).
3. The reader looks for (ID,K) in the database such that
c = F (0, Gi(K), a) with i < t, gets ID, sends d =
F (1, Gi(K), a) to the tag, and replaces entry (ID,K)
by (ID, Gi(K)) in the database.
4. The tag checks d = d′.
After t malicious queries to the tag, it is “grilled” because
its state and the database are de-synchronized. Thus, the
hypothesis of Lemma 3 is not fulfilled.
There exist many variants of this protocol [2, 4, 10, 11, 9].
Theorem 3. Assuming that the parameters k and t are
polynomially bounded and that 2−k is negligible, the above
scheme is a secure and narrow-destructive private RFID
scheme in the random oracle model.
As already seen, this protocol fails to be weak private. This
is the same as in Section 5.1.
Proof. We apply Lemma 2 to get reader correctness. In
cases where the tag was correctly identified by the reader,
tag correctness is rather trivial.
To prove security, we only have to prove simple reader
authentication and to apply Lemma 1. To do so, we assume
w.l.o.g. that the reader never picks the same a twice and
that iterating S ←− G(S) on the tag does not cycle during
the attack. We consider a protocol transcript (a, c, d) on the
tag side with no matching conversation with the reader and
we stop the adversary before sending d to the tag.
If a was not released by any protocol session, then the
query (1, S, a) was only made once to compute the expected
d′. Hence, the value of d′ is random and matches d with
negligible probability.
If a was released by a protocol session, from our assump-
tion it was selected only once in a session pi. Let cˆ the value
sent back to the reader and dˆ its response. If c 6= cˆ, the
reader cannot identify the tag thanks to simple tag authen-
tication. Hence, dˆ comes from a random query. So, the value
of d′ is random and matches d with negligible probability.
Finally, if c = cˆ, since conversations are not matching, we
have d 6= dˆ. If the reader does not identify the tag, we are
back to the previous case. Otherwise, we have d′ = dˆ thus
d 6= d′: the tag does not authenticate the reader.
Hence, we have a secure simple reader authentication. To
prove a secure simple tag authentication, we proceed simi-
larly.
The proof for narrow-destructive privacy from [14] also
works for the enriched protocol if we simulate d on the reader
side in the same way that we simulate c on the tag side:
following the lazy sampling technique.
6.3 Narrow-Strong+Forward Privacy
Finally, we enrich the protocol from [14] based on an IND-
CCA Public-Key Cryptosystem (PKC). A PKC includes a
key generator, an encryption algorithm, and a decryption
algorithm. Correctness ensures that the decryption of the
encryption of any x is always x. The scheme is IND-CCA-
secure if all polynomial-time adversaries win the IND-CCA
with negligible advantage. In the IND-CCA game, the ad-
versary receives a public key, does decryption queries, sub-
mits two plaintexts, receives the encryption of one of the
two, further do decryption queries except on the challenged
ciphertext, and tries to guess which plaintext was encrypted.
The reader setup algorithm first generates a private/public
key pair (KS ,KP ). The tag setup algorithm SetupTag(ID)
picks a k-bit key K and sets the initial state to
S = (KP , ID,K).
The parameter k and α must be polynomially bounded. The
protocol is depicted on Fig. 3.
1. The reader sends an identification request with an α-
bit random a.
2. The tag picks a random β-bit b, stores it in tempo-
rary memory, and sends c = EncKP (ID||K||a||b) to the
reader.
3. The reader gets ID||K||a||d = DecKS (c) and checks
that a is correct and that (ID,K) is in database.1 If
not, d is sent to a random value. The reader then sends
d to the tag.
1As in [14] we can later use K = FKM (ID) with a PRF F
and a master secret KM as depicted on Fig. 3 to get rid
of the database. Thanks to the PRF property, this change
does not modify the privacy result.
Tag System
state: KP , ID,K (K = FKM (ID)) secret keys: KS ,KM
a←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− pick a ∈ {0, 1}α
pick b ∈ {0, 1}β
c = EncKP (ID||K||a||b) c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ parse DecKS (c) = ID||K||a′||d
check a = a′
check K = FKM (ID)
check b = d
d←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− if fail, set d to random
output: OK iff check output: ID or ⊥ if failed
Figure 3: A Narrow-Strong and Forward -Private RFID Scheme based on a PKC.
4. The tag checks that b = d.
Theorem 4. If the public-key cryptosystem is IND-CPA-
secure then the above RFID scheme is narrow-strong private.
If the cryptosystem is IND-CCA-secure and 2−k is negligible,
the RFID scheme is further secure and forward private.
Namely, with an IND-CCA PKC, this RFID scheme achieves
privacy with respect to the class
FORWARD ∪ (NARROW ∩ STRONG).
Proof. Correctness of the protocol is trivial from the
correctness of the cryptosystem.
To prove security, we only have to prove simple security
and to apply Lemma 1.
We assume w.l.o.g. that the reader never picks the same
a twice. We consider a protocol transcript (a, c, d) on the
tag side with no matching conversation with the reader and
we stop the adversary before sending d to the tag. If (a, c)
has a matching conversation, then the reader released some dˆ
which must be different from d so reader authentication fails.
Otherwise, sending c in any other reader protocol session
would not match the corresponding aˆ since it must differ
from a, so the simulation of the reader for sending c is easy:
one just picks a random dˆ. So, we can simulate the reader by
using a decryption oracle that is never queried with c. If we
now simulate the tag by asking the encryption of ID||K||a
concatenated with a random b chosen by a challenger, we
obtain an IND-CCA adversary who guesses this b. Thanks
to IND-CCA security, it succeeds with negligible probability.
This proves simple reader authentication.
Simple tag authentication works as in the proof from [14].
The scheme is narrow-strong private, thus narrow-forward
private. Thanks to Lemma 3, we deduce that it is forward
private. So, we only have to prove narrow-strong privacy.
But the proof of [14] works the same in the enriched proto-
col.
7. CONCLUSION
We have shown how to formalize the notion of mutual
authentication in RFID schemes, as well as security and pri-
vacy. To address corruption, we must assume that tags have
temporary memory which erases itself when the tag does not
receive any power. We have identified protocols which fail
to provide privacy. We further enriched previously proposed
protocols to achieve mutual authentication. Finally, we let
open the problem of achieving weak and narrow-forward pri-
vacy based on no public-key cryptography.
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